

National Consensual Narrative against Terrorism

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Abstract

When Taliban were fighting against USSR, America, Pakistan and Western bloc along with many other countries of the world gave them moral and material support. They were given the name of Mujahideen and their struggle against USSR was considered as 'holy war'. They also developed a strong narrative that impressed not only Mujahideen but the outer world also. However, after the disintegration of USSR, they were left unattended; therefore, they also changed their direction and started their struggle against imperialism and non Muslim Europe and especially America. After the incident of 9/11 USA along with her allies launched a war against them labeling them as terrorists. However there is a point of view that they cannot be completely defeated with military force. Their ideology or narrative that has become very strong should also be encountered.

Key Words: Terrorism, narrative, Pakistan, Afghanistan, al-Qaida.

Introduction

"Mujahideen is a word literally comes from the same Arabic root as *jihad*, which means struggle. Therefore, a mujahid is a person who struggles. In the milieu of Afghanistan through the late twentieth century, the mujahideen were Islamic combatants shielding their state from the USSR", which in 1979 assaulted and waged a pointless and gory war for a decade. Afghan mujahideen were outstandingly varied group including Uzbeks, Tajiks, ethnic Pashtuns, and others. Some were patron by Iran, whilst numerous groups were formation of Deoband Muslims and pro-Pakistan elements (Szczepanski, n.d. "Who Were the Mujahideen of Afghanistan?" about news. <http://asianhistory.about.com/od/glossaryko/q/Who-Were-the-Mujahideen-of-Afghanistan.htm>.)

In totaling to the Afghanistan battalions, Muslims from other territories voluntarily joined the 'mujahideen lines'. Fighters from Arabs like Osama bin Laden, battalions from Chechnya, and others abetted Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the USSR was formally an agnostic land, detrimental to Islam, and the Chechens had their own anti-Soviet accusations. All these mujahideen fought on the name of Jihad and Qital emphasizing the notion of religious nationalism (Szczepanski, n.d. "Who Were the Mujahideen of Afghanistan?" about news.

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<http://asianhistory.about.com/od/glossaryko/g/Who-Were-the-Mujahideen-of-Afghanistan.htm>.)

CIA and the Arab world sent the Mujahideen to Pakistan. "The United States' CIA had no straight contact with the mujahideen, using furtive ties with the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) instead to funnel in weapons and money." Szczepanski n.d. "Who Were the Mujahideen of Afghanistan?" about news.

<http://asianhistory.about.com/od/glossaryko/g/Who-Were-the-Mujahideen-of-Afghanistan.htm>.)

Tribal people trained them to fight in the forefront in Afghanistan and America bought artillery from Israel and gave them. The ideological indoctrination was given to Taliban Madrassas in frontier areas of Pakistan, financed by fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia and other affluent Gulf states. JUI, Jamat-e-Islami and other political and religious parties and establishment of Pakistan supported them because their religious beliefs were somewhat similar to Taliban as the narratives of Jihad and Qital and the Shari'a philosophy.

Hundreds of Madrassas were opened in Pakistan to train these Mujahideen. The whole literature on the ideologies of Jihad and Qital was compiled under Gen. Zia ul Haq. "In 1971 there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan, but by the end of Zia era in 1988 there were 8,000 madrassas and 25,000 unregistered ones" (Rashid, 2008: 89). Ideological indoctrination and training to fight the superpowers originated in Pakistan. The fighters in the name of 'Allah' conceived by ideologues, organized by politicians, financed by Saudis and equipped by US terminated in the crumble of Soviet Empire. (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2011:11).

Disintegration of USSR

The Soviets sent in martial abet tanks, heavy artillery, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships plus large numbers of military professionals. In spite of extensive use of tanks, bombings, and helicopter gunships, they were inept to take the vale. The mujahideen in the skirmish against the Soviets were assisted by the foreign governments for various motives. "The US supplied finance and weapons to the mujahideen through intermediaries in Pakistan during the scuffle. The US was still stinging from her loss in the Vietnam War, so she did not send in any combat troops" (Zalman, n.d. "Osama bin Laden—Influences on Osama bin Laden from the 1960s through 1996". about news.

<http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/a/binLadenContext.htm>.)

Holy War

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National Security Advisor of America Brzezinski in 1980 came and addressed the mujahideen that “We know of their deep belief in God and we are confident that their struggle will succeed. The land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day, because your fight will prevail and you will have your homes and your mosques back again because your cause is right and God is on your side” (http://sites.google.com/site/humanbeingsfirst/download-pdf/god_is_on_your_side.wmv.) Pakistan, China, the UK, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran also supported mujahideen in their cause.

As the war in the name of ‘Allah’ in Afghanistan dragged on, the Soviets confronted with a harsh reality and were enforced to withdraw in humiliation, having lost 15,000 troops in addition to 500,000 injured. As former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, “They (the Afghanis) have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country” (Szczepanski, n.d. “Afghanistan Facts and History”. *about education* <http://asianhistory.about.com/od/afghanista1/p/ProfAfghanistan.htm>). The costly and elongated war put down the economy of Soviet in fiasco. After the withdrawal, in December 1991, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.

The Afghan mujahideen secured the immense credit for their triumph above the Soviet Army. Geared up with their acquaintance of the mountainous territory, their obstinacy, and their absolute repugnance to let the Red army to oppress Afghanistan, small troops of frequently poorly equipped mujahideen fought with one of the globe's superpowers to collapse. It was a success for Afghanistan, with more than 1 million Afghans dead and 5 million expatriated in the rouse of the battle; political turmoil would let the fundamentalist Taliban to take command in Kabul. (Szczepanski, n.d. “Afghanistan Facts and History”. *about education*. <http://asianhistory.about.com/od/afghanista1/p/ProfAfghanistan.htm>.)

Taliban’s Interpretation of Islam

In 1989 when the Afghan Mujahideen drove the Soviets out from Afghanistan, they fought among themselves for control. Anarchy and civil war arose in Afghanistan. The Taliban, a faction nurtured by Pakistan, prevailed influence of the capital in 1996. “Their dictatorial command, which they justified with philosophy to strict interpretations of Islam, repelled the world community”. The Taliban administered the country till 2001. (Zalman, n.d. “Global Terrorism Expert War in Afghanistan is the United States' Most Pressing Military Challenge.” *about news*. http://terrorism.about.com/od/afghanistan/tp/Guide_to_Afghanistan_War.htm.)

“The Afghan ‘Islamicists’ political failure and their inability to produce reality base theories of change is a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim World. The Mullahs tried to push Islam down the people’s throat. The French scholar Olivier Roy has named it the failure of political Islam Afghan’s Islamicists’ failed to resolve the dichotomy of religion and the state” (Rashid, 2008: 87).

Formation of al-Qaida Network

Bin Laden started to fabricate the group that would become Al Qaeda (the base), made up of combatants who had fought in Afghanistan. CIA supported Al-Qaida network headed by Osama bin Laden when they came out from Qandahar. It is formed due to the war scenario in Afghanistan.

“Al Qaeda network provided financial backing to the Taliban, the new Afghan rule allowed bin Laden and his supporters a safe haven in eastern Afghanistan, in the rough territory along the Pakistani frontier. After al-Qaida attacked on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Bill Clinton in 1998 ordered missile attacks against bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan” (Gunratna & Iqbal, 2011: 25).

Al-Qaida (the Base) is at the centre of an extensive network of groups present in more than seventy countries and Al-Qaida’s objective is the re-establish the Caliphate that existed in the in the reign of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) abolished after World War 1 (Leonard, 2005: 50-52).

“Bin Laden got training from the CIA. Azzam encouraged bin Laden to spend money and recruit Arabs to assist the Mujahideen fend off the Soviets, and he procured an influential role in the initial organization of al-Qaeda. Their network is everywhere and nowhere, using each and every regional conflict as a convenient staging-ground for its global mission”(Gunratna & Iqbal, 2011: 40.)

Pakistan openly supported Taliban before 9/11 without taking care of the whole world that was against them. When the incidents of 9/11 occurred, America and the allied countries said that Al-Qaida did these attacks and Taliban supported Al-Qaida and Pakistan supported Taliban. America opposed Osama and Pakistan also because she thought that Pakistan gave him a ‘safe haven’. So, Pakistan is liable for that. The Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage threatened ISI, “We will bomb you to the stone age” immediately after 9/11. (Gunratna & Iqbal, 2011: 40). Pakistan was again asked for her support to overthrow the Taliban. Pakistan supported America with intelligence cooperation to abolish Taliban regime.

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Post 9/11 Scenario

America perceived them a danger and on the other side the notorious 9/11 assaults on the US, a United States-led alliance foray on Afghanistan, in retaliation for its support of al Qaeda, banishing the Taliban command by December, 2001. Now the strength of Taliban is not known, approximately from 25,000 to 40,000 combatants, but it possibly alters with time.

Following Pres. Bush's declare to topple the Taliban regime, war in Afghanistan began in October 2001. On October 7, 2001 the US began operation in Afghanistan. The Taliban were hastily retreated, which gave the US an impression of immediate conquest. In the subsequent some years, the Taliban restructured to turn into a pungent mutineer power. U S, NATO and joined armed forces kept on calling salvos in Afghanistan naming Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). By 2008, the circumstances became fierce, messy and worsen for Afghanistan's civilians. (Zalman, n.d. War in Afghanistan is the Most Pressing Military Challenge to United States'." *about news*.

http://terrorism.about.com/od/afghanistan/tp/Guide_to_Afghanistan_War.htm.)

Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put this crucial question in a famous 2003 memo, asking "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?" (Jacobson, 2010: 73.)

Bin Laden's Video Message

After the U.S barrage in Afghanistan in 2001, Osama bin Laden through a television satellite channel Al-Jazeera from his mountain hideaway in Afghanistan sent a video which millions of Muslims saw. He was sitting on a ground with three loyal cohorts, their Kalashnikovs were visible, drank tea before bin Laden started speaking. The video was a feedback of aerial bombardment going on above them. In that video the world's most wanted man so starkly and simply communicated to his fellow Muslims worldwide was nothing less than the salvage of their belief from the attack of the infidels was at risk. Just like Prophet Muhammad (SAW) migrated from Mecca in 622 C.E., with his flanking companion Abu Bakr, had found shelter in a cave. The Americans were presented as infidels and Osama was following the path of Prophet (SAW). Osama let his followers enter into the highest paradise. The perception of martyrdom surfaced and nurtured by a combination of Quranic teachings, *fatwas* and pledges of paradise from the Islamic Tradition (Reuter, 2005: 118).

Taliban's relocation in Pakistan

Taliban found no place in Afghanistan, majority of them shifted to Pakistan although Pakistan allocated 1 Lac army officers on the borders to stop them to enter Pakistan. Al-Qaida and most of them resided in tribal areas but some of them inhabited in other parts of the country. Taliban observed the ideological synchronization with the tribal people. Tribal people offered them a safe haven, support and cooperation. Their presence in South Waziristan was visible to western and Pakistani media also because Uzbeks, Tajiks and Arabs were there. With the passing time they increased rapidly and now they have become the serious threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan.

The prolonged, dense and continually unsettled liaison flanked by Pakistan and Afghanistan is a running theme in the war on terrorism. In a mountainous area, the both states share a porous boundary that is markedly hard to regulate, and is supposed to be the current abode of Al Qaeda network. The frontier region is demographically controlled by ethnic Pashtuns. However, Pashtuns are absolutely unified; the rather identical ethnic composition of the frontier region blurs national distinctions.

After two years of Soviets pulling out of Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein the Iraqi dictator assaulted Kuwait in 1990, war broke out in another part of the Islamic world. The US and cronies included Saudi Arabia reacted with armed forces. For bin Laden, "the American use of Saudi bases to their access into Kuwait amounted to an unendurable foreign activity of the abode of Islam's sacred sites" (Zalman, n.d. "War in Afghanistan is the United States' Most Pressing Military Challenge." *about news*. http://terrorism.about.com/od/afghanistan/tp/Guide_to_Afghanistan_War.htm.)

The Saudi administration perceived Osama bin Laden as a peril, and barred him in 1991. In 1992, "bin Laden took up residence in Sudan, a North African state with an Islamist government. For the next four years, he continued to develop Al Qaeda's network and to instruct guerrilla fighters. Excluded from Sudan in 1996, bin Laden relocated to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The US was mindful of bin Laden by the late 1980s, but it was not until after the Ramzi Yousef's World Trade Center terrorization in 1993 that counterterrorism officials reckoned him a serious hazard, when they apprehended Yousef in a residence related to bin Laden, with other documents linking him to Al Qaeda" (Zalman, n.d. "Osama bin Laden-Influences on Osama bin Laden from the 1960s through 1996" <http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/a/binLadenContext.htm>.)

Bin Laden's *Fatwah*:

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“Bin Laden issued a *fatwa* in 1998, in which he addressed his accusations with Saudi Arabia and the US. In his vision, these included the Saudi avoiding of Islamic law, and her readiness to let the US to occupy it. For bin Laden, this occupation was not only military, but also pecuniary. In his view, American control and policies were running Saudi oil production, and devastating the aptitude of the Saudi Muslims to build up their own country. Bin Laden also made reference to other ways that Muslims had been assailed by either the US or their associate, Israel; in Lebanon, in Bosnia, in Iraq and elsewhere. He urged a sadistic retort to these injustices. In his point, the walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets” (Zalman, n.d. “Osama bin Laden –Influences on Osama bin Laden from the 1960s through 1996” <http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/a/binLadenContext.htm>.)

Objectives of al-Qaida Network:

After initiating al Qaeda, his intentions were the associated objectives of wiping out the Western presence in the Arab Middle East, included fighting American collaborator, Israel, and ousting local partners of the US and instituting Islamic establishments. “In the early 1980s, bin Laden worked with the mujahideen, guerrillas fighting a self-proclaimed ‘holy war’ to eject the Soviets from Afghanistan. From 1986-1988, he himself fought. In 1988, bin Laden formed Al Qaeda (the Base), a militant global network whose original backbone was Arab Mujahideen who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ten years afterward, bin Laden forged the Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, a coalition of terrorist groups intending to wage war against Americans and battle their Middle Eastern military presence” (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2011: 52).

Jihad and its Real Meaning:

The Taliban had initiated an Islamic reform movement and this faction altered both the nature of faiths and political and public life. Western people always rendered “jihad as an Islamic war against unbelievers”. But Jihad in its essence is the “inner struggle of a Muslim”. Islam also allows revolt against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not and Jihad is the mobilizing mechanism to get change (Rashid, 2008:88).

Hence the life of Prophet (SAW) has become the Jihadi ideal perfect Muslim demeanor and political change as the Prophet (SAW) himself revolted, with intense religious and moral anger. “The Taliban considered themselves acting in the spirit of the Prophet’s Jihad”. However Jihad does not endorse the slaughter of the fellow Muslims at any rate. Whereas the “Taliban claim that they are fighting a Jihad. The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own. But they have an ideological base; an extreme form of Deobandism, which was being preached by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan” (Rashid, 2008:88).

Al Qaeda’s use of unsystematic aggression is supported by a persuasive narrative that allows its approach, validates its violent tactics, proliferate its ideology and wins new recruits. In the last decade, the question “What could be an effective counter-narrative to win the battle of ideas and reach the ‘hearts and minds’ of those vulnerable to al Qaeda’s narrative?” (Schmid, 2014: 1.) As Corman (2014) has points out, “narratives are powerful resources for influencing target audiences. They offer an alternative form of rationality deeply rooted in culture, which can be used to interpret and frame local events and to strategically encourage particular kinds of personal action. Their narrative power is derived from the fact that the story hangs together well and rings true for the targeted audience”. (Schmid, 2014: 4).

Narratives of al-Qaida

Most of the narratives told by al-Qaeda follow this plain understanding. It is reflected in and consistent with al-Qaeda’s overall narrative:

1. “Muslims are under attack everyone (set-up);
2. Only Al Qaeda and its followers are fighting the oppressors of Islam (climax);
3. If you are not supporting al-Qaeda, then you are supporting the oppressors (resolution/challenge)” (Quiggin, 2009: 22.) It is a reality that the only narrative plays a momentous role in the way for susceptible young Muslims toward violence by:
 1. “Identifying a problem as not just a misfortune, but an injustice;
 2. Constructing a moral justification for violence (religious, ideological, political);
 3. Blaming the victims (it is their own fault);
 4. Dehumanizing the victims through symbols and language (pigs and apes);

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5. Displacing responsibility (God or other authorities ordered the individual to commit the act of violence) or diffusing responsibility (the group, not the individual, is responsible); and
6. Misconstruing or minimizing harmful effects (by using euphemisms or by contrasting one's own atrocities with other acts by the enemy which are said to be much worse)" (Schmid, 2014:7.)

Al-Qaida offers the rationalization of using violence against others known as their enemy. There is something distressing and alarming regarding the conception that human beings would sacrifice their own lives in order to kill others; their lives have worth only as a weapon. The followers of Osama skilled in suicide and massacre, and demonstrating his nihilistic account of the doctrine of Jihad bent on annihilating everything. They felt their cause more than their lives. "They kindle fear in people and there is no way to retaliate against attackers who hit, not just to kill others, but to die at the same stroke". (Reuter, 2005: 1).

Suicide bombing is a time-honoured taboo. Martyrs at present are of immense propaganda value. They pronounce to their own people: "Follow our example; the cause is greater than our (and your) lives. And they say to the outside world: we fear humiliation more than we fear death, and, therefore, we have no fear of your well trained and well equipped armies, your high-tech arsenal. To the potential recruit for a suicide mission, the more powerless he may have felt before committing the attack, the more dramatically death will exalt him" (Reuter, 2005: 120).

Vulnerability to al-Qaida Narrative

The suicide attack happened on 12 August 2001 at the Wall Street café in Shariat Motzkin, in the northern Israel. "A twenty eight year old Muhammad Mahmoud Nassr, approached to the waitress at the café bar, lifted his T-shirt and asked her if she knew 'that' was. People started screaming and rushed outside. Muhammad Mahmoud Nassr was alone in the empty café, cried 'Allahu Akbar' – God is great- and then blew himself up: his upper body was teared apart, while his head landed on the table. It was baffling and, fortunately for those in the café at that time". The international and Israeli media ignored it, because nobody died except the attacker and it was his dilemma. How easily he has scared people and people are true to be terrified (Reuter, 2005: 4).

Change in the Outlook of Terrorists

In 1970's the Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins shared an outlook of terrorists that they "wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. They saw the mass murder as counterproductive. But in recent years after the 9/11 attacks, the new terrorists are now interested in mass murder. The practitioners of new terrorism believe themselves to be acting like in the name of God. And it is God that their deeds are directed" (Leonard, 2005: 47). The terrorists now plot suicide bombs on various places; Religious Motivation, Narcissistic Rage and Vengeance are found the reasons. Mullah Baitullah introduced the technology of bombing. Baitullah Mehsood and Qari Hussain were given the early training of bomb attacks. Taliban fought with the ideology of Jihad but al-Qaida was more radicalized its narrative was more logical and it gave technique and narrative to recruit the new people. The intent of this study was to investigate the beliefs, narratives and ideologies that lead to violent radicalism strengthened by a repellent construal of Islam and how to counter it.

Al-Qaida's Justifications

1. "Jihadism is inferred as a way of life or a permanent and individual obligation on all Muslims.
2. Takfir is considered a very serious act of accusing others of being infidels or non-believers. Al- Qaeda, however, has frequently employed the term in an attempt to discredit or disparage other by doing so, fellow Muslims are now turned into enemies.
3. The world as an abode of war (Dar-al-Harb); the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds are assumed to be in a state of war until the rule of Shari'a is established.
4. Attacking the far enemy is a strategic switch from targeting the 'near' enemy (apostate Muslim governments) to attacking the US and its western allies straight. Here the keystone justification is probably that nationalist propensities within the jihadist movements are minimized and that a pan-Islamic movement will be mobilized in a response to the 'war on terror.'
5. Suicide bombing is justified as part of asymmetric feud and the weak position of Muslims. As suicide is an offense in Islam, suicide bombing is recast as self-martyrdom and sacrifice for the cause.
6. The killing of other Muslims is vindicated on the basis that they are either complicit through voting /paying taxes to Western or apostate

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Muslim governments, that they oppose the establishment of an Islamic state, or that they are collateral damage and, as Muslims, martyrs to the cause.

7. The return of the caliphate is a world government ruled by the precepts of Shari'a, starting with the restoration of a caliphate somewhere in the Muslim world" (Ahmed et al. 2008:5.)

The shi'ites of Hezbollah were the first to suicide attacks and regarded it as martyr operation. Their ideologies shaped and myths they made up to magnetize and exploit the millions of zealots throughout the Islamic World. The trust in a future paradise rationalizes the deeds of many suicide attackers and it is a sound ideology for war (Reuter, 2005:12).

Fatwas of Religious Scholars on Terrorism

Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz bin- Abdullah al-Sheikh began the fracas by delivering "a clear rebuff of terrorist attacks against civilization, declaring that the Shari'a provided no justification either for so-called suicide attacks or for aircraft hijackings. Such attacks, he declared are not part of Jihad and I fear they are just suicides plain and simple. Although the Quran sanctions, in fact demands, that the enemy be killed but this has to happen in such a manner that it does not run contrary to the religious laws" (Reuter, 2005: 123.) The Mufti of the Jericho, Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Jamal, published a *fatwa* which for the first time interpreted the "huge difference between martyrdom, which is both permitted and desirable in Islam, and suicide, which leads straight to hell" (Reuter, 2005: 123.)

Regarding the efforts of religious scholars, Pakistani scholar Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, made a *Fatwa* on Terrorism, since 2010, a methodical effort to weaken the religious validation for al Qaeda's terrorization and suicide bombings policy. Holding a degree in Islamic law, he tried to prove that "terrorists distort the concept of Jihad", that terrorism is not even acceptable in warfare and that "terrorist acts expel a Muslim from Islam" (Schmid, 2014: 25).

Counter fatwas on the legitimacy of Terrorism

Opponents of Saudi grand Mufti attacked on the legitimacy of suicide bombing practice did not shy away from playing political hardball. Hamas Sheikh Hamid al-Bitawi put forward the thesis that "if infidels occupy even the tiniest bit of Muslims land, as happened when the Jews occupied Palestine. The Jihad becomes the duty of every individual and thus suicide attacks become permissible" (Reuter, 2005: 123). Dr. Abdulaziz al-Rantisi, second in

command of Hamas political wing, finally explained that “it was all a question of definition: If a martyr wants to kill himself because he’s sick of being alive, that’s suicide. But if he wants to sacrifice his soul in order to defeat the enemy and for God’s sake-well, then he’s a martyr” (Reuter, 2005: 123).

The 1995 television declaration of Yosuf al –Qaradawi, “is the highest form of jihad and are most certainly permitted by the Shari’a, which says: A person, who commits suicide, kills himself for the faith and nation is the mujahid, the warrior, has total faith in God’s mercy whereas the person who kills himself for his own benefits. The mujahid becomes a living bomb who decides when and where the explosion will take place in the enemy’s midges, which renders them helpless in the face of the brave martyr who has sold his soul to Allah, and who has sort out martyrdom for God’s sake”. In these operations, insisted Qaradawi, “even women and children aren’t to be spared, to be sure, if a child or an old man is killed in the process, then it’s not intentional but an oversight.; a mistake for reason of military necessity. Necessity justifies what is forbidden” (Reuter, 2005: 122.)

Religious Stance

Al-Bukhari dictates an entire chapter on this topic: “On one occasion, the Prophet (SAW) was present when a wounded man committed suicide, “My servant took his life into his own hands and thus pre-empted my decision. Therefore, his entry into paradise is barred”. In surah 29 of part 5 of the Quran ‘anfusakum’ can mean both “don’t kill yourself either! For God is merciful”. “Don’t become a suicide... and do not kill each other”; and “do not commit suicide” and finally “do not kill those who share your own faith!” The famous Quranic commentator and Historian at–Tbari offered a construal of the verse in question “if a Muslim kills another Muslim, it’s as if he’s killing himself” (Reuter, 2005: 118).

Viewpoint of a Suicide Bomber

An interview of a suicide bomber under arrest was taken by Saleem Safi. In the answers of certain questions he said, “They are not suicide bombers they are *fiyadeen*. When he will be released, he will go on to do Jihad and no change will occur in his thinking. He will follow his ‘Amir’ whom he accepted according to Shariyah. He will take revenge as much as he can. Even if it includes his family, even then he will blow himself. Only those who are taking part in Jihad, they are innocent. He further said, “We have no repentance, no sorrow for killing. If our leader orders us to kill two people and hundreds are killed in this process then we will do so. No one is innocent in Pakistan even the children accept the people who are in Waziristan and fighting jihad. No

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permission is essential when Jihad becomes obligatory. He does not accept the scholars and the Govt. of Pakistan and all these scholars neither participate nor belief in Jihad. On the contrary Maulana Hassan Jan and Moulana Naeemi condemned Jihadi Taliban and Maulana Naeemi has issued a *fatwa* against Taliban. He said that there is a book written by an Arab scholar that justifies the legitimacy of suicide bombing. He said that he doesn't wish to marry, seventy virgins are waiting for him in heaven so why should he prefer only one. Their leader also told them that they will not be responsible for the killing of those, who are killed other than their target". http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2d201b_suicide-bomber-interview-by-saleem-safi-on-geo-tv-exclusive_shortfilms

Significance of Counter-narrative

To counter the terror campaigns, it is essential to comprehend the lure of the narrative or the messages of al-Qaeda and its factions. These narratives are used to inculcate and twirl puerile brains; they felt captivated to these vicious ideas (Quiggin, 2009: 18). An effective counter-narrative will require addressing not only those susceptible to the terrorists (Jacobson, 2010: 75.) To argue against such narratives, it is crucial to know which facets of al-Qaeda's ideological applications are functioning.

The several administrations and people in the West and in the region, "the narratives they hear are about peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and conflict intervention. The ideology they talk are about repression of Muslims, which is either portrayed as being unnoticed by the West (Chechnya) or worse still, carried out by the West (ex- Yugoslavia)" (Quiggin, 2009: 25.)

There is a rising consensus nowadays that "countering the ideology that of Al-Qaeda's and those of like-minded groups should be confronted with a counter-narrative of logical appeal. After glancing at the motives why, strategies by which, individuals are radicalized; it is palpable that, as a senior British intelligence official stated, there is no single path that leads people to violent extremism. Rather, as the official continued, social, foreign policy, economic, and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists." (Schmid, 2014: 25).

"Al Qaeda fabricates its political narrative on the religious practices of Islam, opting and altering key elements from the Quran and the Hadith, from Prophet's life and from the early precedent of Islam for its own ideological use. Islamism of Jihadist in the Islamic tradition gives al Qaeda's narrative a clear rationalization and unique appeal". (Raffie, 2012: 18).

By using Islam to justify its existence and actions, Pakistan allows Islamist opponents to claim “un-Islamic” actions to negate the basis of Pakistan’s existence. Al-Qaeda has established a dynamic through the clever manipulation of narratives, creating an environment where other actors promote or reinforce its master narratives (Khan, 2013: 6-8).

Conclusion

Non-Pakistanis cannot engender narratives for Pakistan. They must be implanted in the values, experiences, and expectations of Pakistanis themselves. The dominance of radical narratives in Pakistan’s social identity is by no means an inevitable consequence. The country undergoes from a certain narrative frailty, which is the product of the circumstances of its origin and the policy choices of leaders. Nevertheless, it is greatest responsibility for its diverse communities to negotiate and develop narratives about themselves, their place in their nation, and their nation’s place in the world. The basic error of Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy is that it is driven militarily. Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation and reaches the hearts and minds of those susceptible to al Qaeda’s. Many operations had been conducted to eliminate several militant groups. In near past the operation Rah-e-Haq in 2007 and operation Rah-e-Rast in 2009 had been launched in Swat. In June 2014, Pakistan Armed Force initiated the Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan (part of the FATA along the Afghan boundary) but the operation was accelerated after the suicide attack in APS Peshawar on 16 December 2014. The dilemma of Pakistani establishment is that the war is going on without planning. Extremist groups, al-Qaeda chief among them, have been able to exploit this vulnerability to influential effect, using Pakistan to make global points whilst escalating their influence within the country itself. Outside factors can counter this effect by a long-term commitment. The need of the hour is that the religious beliefs, approach, ideology and narrative of Taliban should be understood. Pakistani officials, government and religious leaders are failed to make a counter narrative. State, media, religion and security institutions of Pakistan should co-operate each other for de-radicalization. Islam should not be used for political gain. The Afghan Taliban should be accommodated in the mainstream. The philosophy of suicide and killing the fellow Muslims and the hangings cannot counter the terrorism but the counter narrative should be built.

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